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When the Australian Constitution was passed into law by the
British Imperial Parliament in 1900,' the structure of government
envisaged was a combination of the Westminster system 2 and
United States Federalism. In the last ten years the expanding
scope of Australia's external affairs power has indicated a move to-
wards a more centeralized form of government. The opinions of
the High Court, developments in Australian politics and the in-
creasing interdependence of nations have contributed to the grow-
ing use of the external affairs power by the Commonwealth to
encroach on areas previously left to the State's4 control.
Section 51 of the Australian Constitution delegates to the Par-
liament thirty-nine seperate heads of power under which to legis-
late for the peace, order and good government of the
* B.A., 1971, Eckerd College; J.D., 1979, cum laude, Stetson University; LL.M., Inter-
national Law, University of Miami, 198 1. Member of the Florida Bar. Currently a Foreign
Service Officer on assignment with the United States State Department at the United States
Embassy in London.
1. The Australian Constitution forms section Nine of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act of 1900. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63-64.
VICT. STAT. 25, c. 12. The text of the Australian Constitution is reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS
OF NATIONS 93 (Peaslee ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as AUSTL. CONST.].
2. The term Westminster Government derives from a system under which a bicameral
Parliament, meeting at Westminster, made laws while the Kings ministers controlled the
day-to-day administration of those laws and an independent judiciary enforced them. W.
McMinn, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA iX (1979).
3. Federalism is a system of government that divides political power between a central
authority and a number of component territorial units. Any constitution that guarantees
independent jurisdiction to a number of component units of government can be character-
ized as a federal constitution. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: How AND WHY IT WORKS 11-12
(Encyclopaedia Britannica ed. 1978).
4. Australia consists of a federation of six States. These are: New South Wales, Victo-
ria, Queensland, South Austalia, Western Australia and Tasmania. Australia also has exten-
sive territorial interests. The "internal" territories are Northern Territory and Australian
Capital Territory. The "external" territories are Papua, Norfolk Island, Australian Antarctic
Territory, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Territory of New Guinea, and Nauru. I CONSTITU-
TIONS OF NATIONS 90 (Peaslee ed. 1950).
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Commonwealth.5 Of these, the external affairs power of section
51(29) is by far the most expansive. Through this head of power
Parliament can legislate domestically in areas not covered by other
delegated powers and, on occasion, preempt powers traditionally
reserved to the States.
Perhaps the most common way the Australian government in-
vokes the external affairs power for purposes of domestic legislation
is through treaties and conventions. Since Australia has no self-
executing treaties, 6 a main function of the external affairs power is
to give internal affect to treaties by granting Parliament the power
to pass effectuating legislation. The areas in which the external af-
fairs power may be used to legislate domestically are not limited,
however, to treaties and conventions. The expanding scope of the
external affairs power and its consequent effect on Australia's fed-
eralism is the subject of this Article.
The scope and evolution of Australia's external affairs power
was comprehensively examined in 1971 by Professor Howard.7
Since that time new decisions touching on this power have been
handed down by the Australian High Court. These decisions show
the continuing dichotomy between two judicial approaches to the
problem of Commonwealth attempts to expand control over mat-
ters formerly left to the States. The more liberal approach, taken
by the majority of the High Court, views the external affairs power
as an independent and express legislative power limited only by
express constitutional prohibitions. Their definition of what consti-
tutes an external affair continues to increase in breadth. The more
conservative approach, generally taken by the minority of the
Court, limits the external affairs power by both express and implied
constitutional prohibitions. Their definition of external affairs, for
purposes of invoking domestic legislation, is restricted to the more
conventional definition of international agreements.
After giving a brief overview of the Australian federal struc-
ture and examining the treaty power of the Australian Constitution,
5. AUSTL. CONST., supra note 1, § 51.
6. In comparison, the United States does have self-executing treaties, wherein rights
and liabilities are created thereunder without the necessity of further action by Congress.
See Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); See also U.S. CONST., art.
VI, § 2.
7. Howard, The ExternalAffairs Power ofthe Commonwealth, 8 MELB. U.L. REv. 193
(1971). This article was later incorporated in chapter seven of Professor Howard's book,
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. All references will be to the textbook C. HOWARD,
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441 (2d ed. 1972).
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this Article surveys the major High Court decisions interpreting the
external affairs power up to the time of Professor Howard's article
in 1971. The Article then reviews the decisions of the High Court
since that time. It will show the emergence of two distinct trends in
the Court's interpretation of the external affairs power and the na-
ture of an external affair. The relationship between the external
affairs power and the Charter of the United Nations is then ex-
amined. Finally, the limitations on the external affairs power are
explored.
I. THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE
A. The Commonwealth Constitution
The Australian Constitution was passed into law by the British
Imperial Parliament in 1900,8 at the request and with the coopera-
tion of the Australian colonies. At that time the structure of gov-
ernment envisaged was a combination of the United States
federation structure and the Westminister system of parliamentary
responsibility. Today, Australia's government can best be charac-
terized as a Federal Commonwealth.9
Australia's Federal Parliament consists of the Crown, Senate
and House of Representatives. The Executive power of the Crown
is vested in the Governor General, who is the Monarch's represen-
tative. 10 The Governor General acts on the advice of a Federal
Executive Council composed of ministers of state, chosen and sum-
moned by the Governor General," upon the advice of the Prime
Minister. Officers of the Executive Government must be members
of the Parliament. The Executive Government is wholly responsi-
ble to the Parliament.'
2
The Legislative department consists of two chambers. The
Senate is the upper chamber and consists of senators elected from
each State on a basis of equal representation.' 3 The Senate's pow-
ers are not quite as strong as those of the United States Senate, but
strong enough to resolve the inevitable deadlocks between the
lower and upper house when different parties hold majorities in
8. See note I supra.
9. I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 90 (Peaslee ed. 1950).
10. AUSTL. CONST., supra note 1, § 2.
11. Id. §§61 & 62.
12. Id.§64.
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each chamber. 4 The lower chamber is the House of Representa-
tives whose membership is proportionate to the population, with a
minimum of five representatives for each State.' 5
Like the United States Constitution, the Constitution Act' 6
provides for a Commonwealth Government of delegated or enu-
merated powers.' 7 The powers not delegated to the Common-
wealth are considered to be left to the States.'8 One qualification
though, is that since the States were separate entities under the Im-
perial Parliament, they did not have a given legislative power at
federation and therefore cannot be considered as having a residue
of that power.' 9
Federal laws enacted pursuant to a delegated power will take
precedence over inconsistent State laws.20 Like the United States
doctrine of "federal preemption", 2' Commonwealth supremacy
also takes place where the Federal Government enacts laws with
the intent to "cover the field".22
Overseeing the balance between the Commonwealth and the
States is the High Court. Its jurisdiction, including for our pur-
poses, treaty matters is covered in section 75:
14. Id. § 57.
15. Id. § 24.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. The United States Federal Government is one of enumerated rather than inherent
powers. The Government can only act to effectuate the powers specifically granted to it by
Article 1, § 8 of the United States Constitution. However, under the doctrine of implied
powers set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) certain broad
federal powers are implied from the necessary and proper clause (U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl.
18).
18. AUSTL. CONST., supra note 1, § 107. In the United States the corresponding grant of
power comes from the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides
that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States .. " These words no longer have quite the power a
literal interpretation would give them. Today, the Tenth Amendment is interpreted to "ex-
pressly declare the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the State's integrity or their ability to function effectively in. a federal system."
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
19. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 12. Compare the United States approach in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
20. AUSTL. CONST., upra note 1, § 109.
21. Under this doctrine the United States Congress may have the exclusive power to
regulate in certain fields where uniform national laws on the subject are deemed necessary
and desireable. A good example is Congress' power to pre-empt State regulation of inter-
state commerce.
22. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 34. Compare the United States Supreme Court's use of
the "federal preemption" doctrine in the airline area in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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Original Jurisdiction of High Court
In all matters-
23(i) Arising under any treaty:...
The power of judicial review along the lines of Marbury v.
Madison,24 was established at an early date, even though the
United States case was not formally adopted by the Common-
wealth until later.2 5 Initial problems of strict judicial interpretation
of the Constitution Act by English-style statutory construction tech-
niques, rather than constitutional construction methods, have also
been overcome.26 Since the Engineer's Case in 1920, it has been a
settled canon of construction that Commonwealth powers are to be
given a wide construction.
27
B. The Treaty Power
The Commonwealth follows a Westminster system with re-
spect to treaties. The negotiation, policy making and ratification of
a treaty is purely an Executive action which binds only the
Crown.28 The rights of subjects are not affected by a treaty, only by
the domestic legislation which implements the treaty.29 Australia
23. Section 38(a) of the Judiciary Act invests the High Court with exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to "matters arising directly under any treaty." For a discussion of the back-
ground and analysis of High Court Jurisdiction in respect to treaties, see Z. COWEN, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA 24-32 (1951).
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). In this case the United States
Supreme Court held that it had the power to review Acts of Congress and declare them void
if repugnant to the United States Constitution.
25. Marbury v. Madison, Id., was formally adopted by the Australian High Court in
Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1, 262-63 (1951).
26. "We must... remember that it is a constitution we are construing," R. v. Public
Vehicles Licensing Approval Tribunal of the State of Tasmania, ex parle Australian Na-
tional Airways Pty. Ltd., 113 C.L.R. 207, 225 (1964). See also Dixon, Marshall and the Aus-
tra/ian Constitution, 29 A.L.J. 420 (1955).
27. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd., 28 C.L.R. 129
(1920). The Engineers' Case was a landmark decision in Australian constitutional law. After
the Great War the government of Western Australia undertook the establishment of a com-
plex of State enterprises ranging from a farm-implement factory to a string of butcher shops.
In the Engineers' Case it claimed for its new activities the protection from Commonwealth
Arbitration Court control of implied immunity, and thus effectively reduced the doctrine to
an absurdity. The case clearly overruled the Railway Servants Case which held that an
award of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court could not bind State railway commissioners.
The practical effect of the Engineers' Case was to circumscribe the 'areas and subject matters'
left to the States. W. MCMINN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 127, 136-37
(1979).
28. R. v. Burgess, exparte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608, 644 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Bur-
gess] (Chief Justice Latham); Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario,
A.C. 326, 347-48 (1937); Walker v. Baird, A.C. 491 (1892).
29. The implementing legislation may be enacted by the Commonwealth, the States, or
Vol. 12
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does not have self-executing treaties which become internal law
upon ratification.3' Nor does the Australian Senate have any
power to participate in the treaty-making process like its United
States counterpart. 3 '
Of course, a government with any political sophistication is go-
ing to submit major treaties to the Parliament for discussion and
possibly for passage of implementing legislation before Executive
ratification. Nonetheless, the non-existence of self-executing trea-
ties is vitally important for an understanding of the Australian ex-
ternal affairs power. Treaties do not affect Australian internal law
until legislation is enacted pursuant to section 51(29) of the Consti-
tution.32 Thus, the function of the external affairs power, with re-
spect to treaties, is to authorize the Parliament to legislate
domestically to give internal effect to treaties made by the Execu-
tive as part of its conduct of external affairs.33
An analysis of the structure of treaty making has led some jus-
both as long as State legislation is not inconsistent. Burgess, supra Note 28, at 636-37 (Chief
Justice Latham). As for the States continuing exercise residual power in the area of external
affairs, such as the appointment of States Agents-General to London, see Sawer, Australian
Constitutional Law in Relation to International Relations and International Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 38-39 (O'Connell ed. 1965). See also, Sawer, Execution of Trea-
ties by Legislation in the Commonwealth of Australa, 2 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 297, 298 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Sawer, Execution of Treaties]. For another view of possible residual
powers of "international competence" in the States, see Kidwai, ExternalAffairs Power and
Constitutions fBritish Dominions, 9 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 167, 182-84 (1976). For an example
of where the Commonwealth has ratified an international convention, but failed to legislate
pursuant to § 51(29) thus permitting the States to retain legislation contrary to the conven-
tion, see Georgini v. Electric Power Transmission Pty. Ltd., 80 W.N. (N.S.W.) 41. (Case
concerned foreign dependents equal right to state workmen's compensation benefits of de-
ceased under the International Labour Convention.)
30. Cf. (the United States position) Foster and Elam v. Neilson, supra note 6. See also
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
31. United States Constitution, art. II, § 2, cl. 2. While the United States Senate may
not participate directly in the treaty negotiating process, the United States Senate does have a
policy making role. The President needs to muster two-thirds of the Senators to give their
advise and consent to a treaty he desires to ratify. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 37-50 (1972). The balance between the United States President and Sen-
ate in the area of treaties is one of the major battlegrounds of American foreign policy for-
mulation.
32. Burgess, supra note 28, at 644. See also R. v. Poole, ex parte Henry (No. 2), 61
C.L.R. 634 (1939); Bradley v. The Commonwealth of Australia, 128 C.L.R. 577, 582-83
(1973).
33. From the legislative history, the external affairs power was not conceived as a treaty
implementing power. It was most likely originally intended only to give the Commonwealth
government the power to deal with British Commonwealth affairs formerly handled by the
individual States. Due to the changing international status of Australia and the need for
flexible Constitutional construction, the power became converted into what it is today. See
Justice Barton's opinion in McKelvey v. Meagher, 4 C.L.R. 265, 286 (1906). (The case con-
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tices to conclude that the external affairs power permits Parliament
to legislate in areas not covered by other delegated powers; thus
providing Parliament with an independent source of legislative
power.34 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Commonwealth has
acceded to a treaty or convention may not necessarily attract the
legislative power of the Parliament under section 51(29).3" It has
been left to the Australian High Court to determine what an exter-
nal affair is for the purpose of domestic legislation and whether
there is any limitation either on the subject matter of the external
affairs power or the legislation enacted pursuant thereto.
II. INTERPRETING AUSTRALIA'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER
A. The High Court's Interpretation up to 197236
In 1921, the High Court in Roche v. Kronheimer,37 held valid
the broad economic regulations passed by Parliament to implement
the Versailles Peace Treaty. While the legislation could have been
upheld partly under the defense power, the external affairs power
was relied upon and mentioned by Justice Higgins: "It is difficult
to say what limits (if any) can be placed on the power to legislate as
to external affairs. There are none expressed."3
1. R. v. Burgess.39 The first attempt to find these limits and
define an external affair, took place in ?. v. Burgess, the first of
three major decisions considering the external affairs power. In
that case, the defendant was convicted of flying an airplane intra-
State without a federal license, contrary to Commonwealth regula-
tions. The regulations had been made pursuant to section four of
the Air Navigation Act of 1920 which allegedly authorized their
making for two main purposes. One, to implement an international
convention on air navigation, to which Australia was a party and
two, to control aviation in the Commonwealth. The head of power
cerned laws on fugitive offenders. The laws were held a proper exercise of legislative power
pursuant to § 51(29)).
For a survey of the history of § 51(29) see Thompson,-4 United States Guide to Constitu-
tional Limitations Upon Treaties as a Source of Australian Municipai Law, 13 W. AUSTL. L.
REV. 110, 123-27 [hereinafter cited as Thompson].
34. See generally Burgess, supra note 28, at 608.
35. Id at 699 (Justice Dixon).
36. This part draws heavily from Professor Howard's article, supra note 7, and from
JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 198-211 (1969).
37. Roche v. Kronheimer, 29 C.L.R. 329 (1921).
38. Id at 338-39.
39. Burgess, supra note 28, at 608.
Vol. 12
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most nearly allowing the Commonwealth to make regulations for
this later purpose was the interstate commerce power of section
51(1). The Court found that the regulations were too broad to be
supported by section 51(1) and furthermore, they were invalid be-
cause they went beyond the terms of the Convention. The real im-
portance of the case, however, lies in the Court's discussion of the
section 51(29) external affairs power.
The scope of the exteinal affairs power was considered by
three Justices as being very wide. Chief Justice Latham and Jus-
tices Evatt and McTiernan held that section 51(29) was an in-
dependent and express legislative power.' It was also "impossible
to say, a priori that any subject is necessarily such that it could
never properly be dealt with by international agreement. ' 41 No
distinction could be drawn between international affairs and do-
mestic affairs. The kinds of matters to be encompassed within sec-
tion 51(29) must concern other countries as well as Australia and be
matters endeavoring to discern means of living together on practi-
cable terms.42 In short, a reciprocity of interest would make a valid
external affair.
Justices Evatt and McTiernan went very far in holding that the
legislative power under section 51(29) did not arise only when there
was a binding treaty:
[I]t is not to be assumed that the legislative power over "ex-
ternal affairs" is limited to the execution of treaties or conven-
tions; . . .Parliament may very well be deemed competent to
legislate for the carrying out of. . . other international recom-
mendations or requests upon other subject matter of concern to
Australia as a member of the family of nations. The power is a
great and important one.43
These three Justices saw a limitation in the exercise of the power
only in express constitutional prohibitions. Chief Justice Latham
specifically mentioned the prohibitions against establishment of re-
ligion and State control of liquor.' Justices Evatt and McTiernan
listed several others, including the federal structure, duration of a
session of the House of Representatives, the right to vote, trial by
jury, freedom of interstate trade, equal protection of the States in
federal trade, commerce and revenue laws, State water rights and
40. Id at 639.
41. Id at 641.
42. Id at 684 (Chief Justice Latham).
43. Id at 687.
44. Id at 642.
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privileges and immunities between State citizens.45
The two dissenting Justices in the Burgess case, Dixon and
Starke, held a more restricted view of the external affairs power.
They would have allowed the exercise of domestic legislation only
if the international agreement was a matter "of sufficient interna-
tional significance to make it a legitimate subject for international
co-operation and agreement."' This implied an ability to segre-
gate legislatively the international subjects from the national sub-
jects. In addition, Justice Starke would have limited any legislation
by implied as well as express prohibitions in the Constitution Act.47
The fear of these Justices was an "awareness of the potential of
section 51(29) for destruction of the federal balances of legislative
power.
48
All Justices in this case agreed that the Commonwealth could
not use an international agreement solely as a device for acquiring
domestic legislative power by bringing in section 51(29). 49 The
consensus was that of Chief Justice Latham, that there must be, as a
minimum, a genuine mutuality of interest in the subject matter be-
tween the countries concerned.
It should be noted that each case concerning Commonwealth
legislation under section 51(29) can be divided into two issues. The
first issue is whether the subject matter pursuant to which Parlia-
ment is seeking to invoke section 51(29) is an external affair, that is,
an international matter. As we have seen in the Burgess case, three
Justices defined external matters as co-extensive with all possible
subjects of sincere international agreement, even non-binding reso-
lutions. All Justices concurred that agreements on subjects of ex-
press constitutional prohibitions were not valid external matters.
The second issue, assuming a valid external affair or interna-
tional agreement exists, is, to what extent may the legislation imple-
ment the agreement domestically? The Burgess case again pointed
to express constitutional prohibitions. However, on this second is-
sue four of the Justices agreed that the regulations "must in sub-
stance be regulations for carrying out and giving effect to the
convention. ' '50 This test required strict adherence to the agreement
45. Id at 687.
46. Id at 658, quoting from W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 519 (2d ed. 1929).
47. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 450.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Burgess, supra note 28, at 646.
Vol. 12
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and the regulations in the Burgess case were struck down as being
incidental and too far removed. Justice Starke, dissenting, held
that once a matter was determined to be within the scope of section
51(29), the power to implement regulations "must be construed lib-
erally, and much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the
contracting States in framing legislation, or otherwise giving effect
to the convention."'" As Professor Howard pointed out, Justice
Starke's approval is consistent with the belief that section 51(29)
constitutes an independent grant of legislative power.52 If so, then
all incidental matters should be within its scope just like any other
independent power.
While the regulations in the Burgess case were struck down for
deviating too much from the legislation enacted pursuant to section
51(29), the importance of the case was that the Commonwealth was
conceded the power to enact regulations and legislation in an intra-
State area where there was no other power within section 51 dele-
gating that authority.53 The case was easily decided since there was
no direct prohibition in the Constitution on Commonwealth con-
trol of intra-State commerce. Nevertheless, intra-State commerce
had been reserved to the States by not being expressly delegated to
the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was thus using section
51(29) as a source of independently delegated power, permitting it
to encroach upon an area traditionally reserved to the states. These
areas have been ones where the Commonwealth would not have
been able to legislate under other heads of power.
Between the Burgess case and the Second New South Wales
Airlines54 case, there were two decisions adding to the number and
scope of subjects falling within the definition of external affairs.
Both decisions expressed concern over limitations on section
51(29).
2. Ffrost v. Stevenson." In 1937, the Court, consisting of
nearly all the same Justices who decided Burgess, had to rule on the
validity of legislation for the extradition of fugitive offenders from
51. Id at 659.
52. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 454.
53. Regulations setting minimum height levels for flights above airdromes were upheld
in R. v. Poole, exparte Henry (No. 2) 61 C.L.R. 634 (1939).
54. Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd. v. The State of New South Wales and An-
other (No. 2) 113 C.L.R. 54 (1964-65). This was the second major case interpreting the exter-
nal affairs power of section 51(29). See notes 65-75 supra, and accompanying text.
55. Ffrost v. Stevenson, 58 C.L.R. 528 (1937).
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New Guinea. The legislation was enacted pursuant to the Imperial
Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881; an extradition act adopted by the
Australian Government. Since New Guinea was not a State of the
Australian Commonwealth and the legislation was directly affect-
ing the rights of a fugitive within the territory of one of the states, a
separate head of legislative power was needed outside the Com-
monwealth's civil and criminal power delegated by section 51(29).
Two Justices found the legislative power in section 51(29).
Chief Justice Latham stated:
Provisions for reciprocal surrender of persons charged with crim-
inal offenses constitute one of the most ordinary forms of legisla-
tion with respect to external affairs. Therefore, under sec.
51 (xxix) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament has
power to legislate for the peace, order and good government
56
Justice Evatt agreed with Chief Justice Latham on the source of
legislative power, while the other three Justices decided the case in
favor of extradition without reaching the issue of section 51(29).
Justice Evatt, echoing his view in the Burgess case, stated that
the power was "limited only by other express provisions of the
Constitution and its own terms fairly construed. . . ."I' Chief Jus-
tice Latham held, by implication, that laws passed by virture of
sections other than section 122 (legislation over a mandate terri-
tory) were subject to parts of the Constitution which treat the Com-
monwealth as "part of a Federal system in which the
Commonwealth is one element and the States are other ele-
ments."58 In other words, all of the section 51 powers are limited
by federalism.
While the Case adds nothing in the way of elaboration on the
external affairs power, it does point out the continuing use of sec-
tion 51(29) to find legislative power in an area-in this case, crimi-
nal law--that had been left to the States. It also shows that only the
federal structure of the Constitution Act would prevent an abuse of
section 51(29).
3. R. v. Sharkey.59 The next decision of importance was A v.
Sharkey in 1949. In that case legislation passed by the Imperial
56. Id at 557.
57. Id at 601.
58. Id at 556.
59. R. v. Sharkey, 79 C.L.R. 121 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as Sharkey). Mr.
Sharkey was the head of the Australian Communist Party.
Vol. 12
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Parliament, and later adopted by the Commonwealth, made it a
crime to attempt to excite disaffection against the Government or
Constitution of any Dominions. Thus, if an alleged seditious act
was against a non-Australian government, the defendant could be
found guilty in Australia. The Justices upheld this Act. Justice
Dixon stated that "perhaps only under [the external affairs power]
can paragraph (c) be supported."60 Chief Justice Latham justified
the legislation by pointing out the need to maintain good relations
with all countries:
The relations of the Commonwealth with all countries, including
other Dominions of the Crown, are matters which fall directly
within the subject of external affairs .... [The law] may rea-
sonably be thought by Parliament to constitute an element in the
preservation of friendly relations with other Dominions.
6 1
Justice McTiernan concurred in this reasoning.62
In Sharkey, two of the three Justices who took the liberal view
expressed in Burgess, as to what constitutes an external affair, per-
mitted the Federal Government to enact a criminal defamation
statute on the grounds of preservation of good relations with sister
members of the British Commonwealth. The relationship to exter-
nal affairs was rather tenuous and certainly failed any test of mu-
tual reciprocity. The Case, in the words of Sawer:
provides a basis for contending that in order to support Federal
legislation, an international agreement need not be in the precise
and detailed form of a treaty or convention, and that the Federal
Parliament can honor obligations of conscience or of solidarity
which are conducive to an international relationship although
not distinctly required by its terms.
6 3
To the extent this conclusion is accepted, it represents a victory for
Justices Evatt and McTiernan's approach to section 51(29) in Bur-
gess. The case may also be seen as foreshadowing the argument
that legislation can be passed not only for the purpose of imple-
menting an agreement, but also simply because the subject matter
is purely an external affair.'
In Sharkey, a minor intrusion into State criminal law was
made. It is interesting to note that the reasoning in this Case could
be used to permit restrictive human rights legislation which the
60. Id at 149.
61. Id at 136-37 (emphasis added).
62. Id at 157.
63. Sawer, Execution of Treaties, supra note 29, at 298.
64. See text accompanying notes 75-99 mbfra.
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Commonwealth found necessary for the preservation of "good rela-
tions" with foreign governments. This has not happened, but it is
important to point out the lack of a United States - style Bill of
Rights in the Australian Constitution.
4. Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd v. State of New South
Wales.65 The second of the three major cases concerning section
51(29) was the Second New South Wales Airline case.66 Once again
the validity of regulations affecting wholly intra-State aviation was
at issue. The treaty used to invoke section 51(29) was the Chicago
Convention of 1944. The effect of the regulations was to make
wholly intra-State public aviation subject to Commonwealth licens-
ing. This authority permitted the Commonwealth to indirectly pro-
hibit intra-State aviation. Six of the seven Justices held the
regulation valid, but split on the power to be relied upon. Chief
Justice Barwick and Justices Menzies and Owen used both the ex-
ternal affairs power and the trade and commerce power. Justice
McTiernan, taking the most expansive view, held the regulations
valid under the external affairs power alone. In contrast, Professor
Howard felt that the position adopted in construing the regulations,
once a valid external affair was found, should be the plenary power
approach of Justice Starke in Burgess.67 Chief Justice Barwick
stated:
Once it is decided, however, that some treaty or convention
is, or brings into being, an external affair of Australia, there can
be no question that the power under s.5 1(xxix.) of the Constitu-
tion thus attracted is a plenary power and that laws properly
made under it may operate throughout Australia subject only to
constitutional prohibitions express or implied. In particular,
laws, made under this power may operate throughout Australia
without regard to the distinction between inter-State and intra-
State trade and commerce....68
Nonetheless, the mention of implied Constitutional prohibi-
tions recalls the restricted view which Justices Starke and Dixon
used when attempting to first decide if there was a valid external
affairs power. It appears that, in contrast to the Burgess case, Chief
Justice Barwick took a more conservative approach in the Second
New South Wales case when testing the constitutionality of the reg-
65. See note 54 supra.
66. Id.
67. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 455.
68. 113 C.L.R. 54, 85 (1965).
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ulations than did Justice Starke once he found an external matter.
For example, Chief Justice Barwick went on to write:
Whilst the choice of the legislative means by which the treaty or
convention shall be implemented is for legislative authority, it is
for this Court to determine whether particular provisions, when
challenged, are appropriate and adapted to that end. The Court
will closely scrutinize the challenged provisions to ensure that
what is proposed to be done substantially falls within the
power.69
In spite of the strictness of the above test, the majority of the
Justices went on to hold the regulations valid, as a reasonably inci-
dental use of legislative power invoked by section 51(29). Since the
regulations were neither inappropriate, inconvenient nor inconsis-
tent with the international obligation, they were held valid even
though the international obligation said nothing about intra-State
aviation.70
In attempting a synthesis of these first two primary cases-the
Second New South Wales case and Burgess-it seems that the
Court in the Second New South Wales case refused to adopt the
broad test used by Justices Evatt and McTiernan in Burgess to de-
termine what constitutes an international matter. On the other
hand, given a valid external matter, the test for regulations and leg-
islation has been broadened to include incidental matters.
What was different in the Second New South Whales case from
Burgess, was Chief Justice Barwick's straight forward statement
that a law enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of the external af-
fairs power can operate on an intra-State basis.7' The Common-
wealth may submit to the High Court that the treaty demands a
Commonwealth-wide treatment, and if the Court agrees, the Com-
monwealth power can reach into areas normally reserved to the
States.72
The issue of what limitations should be imposed on the exter-
nal affairs power was also reached in the Second New South Wales
case. In that case a regulation73 was struck down which attempted
to remove from the States the powers which they otherwise had to
69. Id at 86 (emphasis added).
70. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 458. This was the test used by Justice Starke in the
Burgess case. See Burgess, supra note 28, at 664.
7 1. This principle was one of the main issues in Burgess, but never expressed so clearly
or sharply as by Chief Justice Barwick in the Second New South Wales case.
72. 113 C.L.R. 54, 84-85 (1965).
73. Commonwealth Regulation 200 (B).
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prohibit flights. This shows in striking contrast the different posi-
tions taken by the United States Supreme Court and the High
Court toward State's powers in commercial aviation.74 In this par-
ticular area of regulation one might conclude that Federalism and
State power are more alive in Australia than in the United States.
Up to this point, we have seen Commonwealth domestic legis-
lation enacted, under the authority of section 51(29), to implement
a peace treaty, extradite fugitives from a State, control intra-State
aviation by licensing, permit Commonwealth regulation of intra-
State aviation, and make it a crime to utter seditious statements
against certain foreign governments. The limitations upon an ex-
ternal affair encompass express Constitutional prohibitions and
possibly implied ones. Regulations enacted under a valid external
matter must adhere to the nature of the obligation, yet may also
include broad incidental ones, only limited by the Constitution and
the federal system.
B. The High Court's Interpretation Since 1972
The latest case interpreting section 51(29), New South Wales v.
The Commonwealth" was handed down by the Court in 1975. Pur-
suant to the ratification of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Seas
and Submerged Lands Act of 1973. The Act claimed Common-
wealth federal jurisdiction over the territorial sea, the air above and
the land below it, and over the continental shelf. The Australian
States claimed that prior to federation they had held sovereignty
over these areas and still did after federation. Apart from the
claims of historic title, issues were raised concerning section 51(29).
Justices McTiernan and Murphy held that the Act represented
a valid exercise of the external affairs power conferred by section
51(29) to implement an international convention. Justice Murphy
74. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 441 U.S. 624 (1973) the Court
per Justice Douglas held a local government authority was preempted by pervasive Federal
regulation from enacting a local airport noise ordinance. But see, British Airways v. New
York and New Jersey Port Authority, 564 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1977). Johnston, supra note
36, at 211, takes a much more restrictive view of the results of the Second New South Wales
case.
75. The State of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth of Australia, 50 A.L.J.R. 218
(1975) [hereinafter referred to as the SubmergedLands case]. See also Dowal v. Murray and
Another, infra note 106, and accompanying text, for the most recent High Court case touch-
ing on § 51(29).
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was the most expansive in his discussion of the power.7 6 Consider-
ing the scope of what may be regarded as an external affair, he held
that such matters included subjects not thought of at the time of
federation and not limited to the subject matter of treaties and con-
ventions to which Australia was a party.77 He stated that: "Exter-
nal affairs may also be internal affiars; they are not mutually
exclusive. 7 8 Justice Murphy was echoing the expansive view of
Justices Evatt and McTiernan in the Burgess case. Any attempt to
delimit subject matter apriori was rejected and overlapping sub-
jects were acknowledged.
Considering the legislation and regulations based on a valid
external matter, Justice Murphy followed Justice Starke's expansive
view of incidental laws. He stated that: "[T]he presumption of va-
lidity should be applied as with other enactments. The use of the
external affairs power may be novel, but this is no excuse for adopt-
ing a narrow, cautious or suspicious approach to Acts which are
said to be supported on that power."' 79 Justice Murphy feared that
narrow interpretations of incidental legislation, or of the scope of
external matters, under section 51(29) would result in turning Aus-
tralia into an "international cripple unable to participate fully in
the emerging world order."" ° He stressed the impracticability of
dealing with many internal affairs except through international
agreements. In his conclusion Justice Murphy held that even if the
Conventions had not been signed, the Act would still be valid since
"this would still be a law with respect to external affairs."
8'
This last statement of Justice Murphy encompassed the ration-
ale which the other three Justices, forming the majority in this case,
used in their opinions. Chief Justice Barwick and Justices Mason
and Jacobs expressed their view of Justice Murphy's rationale as
follows:
[External affairs] are not limited, in my opinion, to the making of
arrangements with other nations or the implementation of such
international arrangements as may properly be made in Austra-
lia's interest with other nations, though doubtless these may be
76. For a concurring analysis of the opinions, see Kidwai, External Affairs Power and
Constitutions oBritish Dominions, 9 U. QUEENSL L.J. 167, 180-81 (1976). Justice Murphy
was appointed to the High Court in 1975. He was the junior justice at the time of this case.
77. 50 A.L.J.R. 218, 277 (1975).
78. Id
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the most frequent manifestations of the exercise of the power.
The power extends, in my opinion, to any affair which in its na-
ture is external to the continent of Australia and the island of
Tasmania subject always to the Constitution as a whole.8 2 (Chief
Justice Barwick)
The plaintiffs' argument proceeds on the footing that the
power is no more than a power to make laws with respect to
Australia's relationships with foreign countries. Why the power
should be so confined is not readily apparent. The power is ex-
pressed in the widest of terms; it relates to "affairs" which are
external to Australia. "Affairs" include "matters" and "things"
as well as "relationships" . . . . (Justice Mason)
[I]t is my opinion that the power conferred by a s.51(xxix) ex-
tends to matters or things geographically situated outside Austra-
lia.8 4 (Justice Mason)
It is therefore submitted that laws made with respect to external
affairs do not comprehend all laws operating upon persons or
things beyond the boundaries of the Commonwealth; that the
source of power to make such laws must be found in other par-
ticular subject matters of legislative power.
In my opinion the Commonwealth has the power to make
laws in respect of any person or place outside and any matter or
thing done or to be done or prohibited to be done outside the
boundaries of the Commonwealth.
The power to make laws in respect of any place outside the
boundaries of the Commonwealth is . . vested in the Austra-
lian Crown by virtue of the extenal affairs power.. . . It is not a
sufficient reason for reading down the meaning of these words
that there are other provisions of the Constitution. . . which ex-
pressly confer power to legislate with extra-territorial effect
... .85 (Justice Jacobs)
The approach of these three Justices in ascertaining the scope
of an external affair gave vitality to the view that a treaty or con-
vention is not always necessary for Parliament to legislate with re-
spect to section 51(29). This was not, however, a novel view for the
High Court. In 1933, the Court held in Jolley v. Mainka,8 6 that
laws passed in respect to mandated territory concerned external af-
fairs. In that case the judgment emphasized that the territory, New
82. Id at 221.
83. Id at 264.
84. Id at 265.
85. Id at 275.
86. Jolley v. Mainka, 49 C.L.R. 242 (1933), referred to by Justices Evatt and McTiernan
in Burgess, supra note 28, at 678.
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Guinea, was outside the territorial limits of the Commonwealth
and States and involved no competition of constitutional powers
between them. Thus, of necessity, the geographically external terri-
tory involved external affairs.
Justices Gibbs and Stephen, dissenting in the Submerged
Lands case, concurred that Parliament's power to legislate with re-
spect to external affairs certainly included external matters.
The extension of the sovereignty of the Commonwealth over
territory, whether on land or at sea, which is not already part of
the Commonwealth, is a matter that affects the external relations
of the Commonwealth. . . . Legislation which gave effect to an
extension of sovereignty or sovereign rights in those circum-
stances would be legislation with respect to external affairs on
the narrowest view of S.51(XXiX). 8 7 (Justice Gibbs)
Treaties and conventions to which a nation may become a party
form, no doubt, an important part of those affairs, but "external
affairs" will also include matters which are not consensual in
character .... 88 (Justice Stephens)
The entire Court was willing to give the Commonwealth domestic
legislative power where the external matter concerned was geo-
graphically external and no convention or treaty was involved.
The above rationale gave Chief Justice Barwick and Justices
Mason and Jacobs an easier way out of the section 51(29) discus-
sion than they might otherwise have had. If they would have had
to base their decision on the implementation of an international
convention, then the second step of evaluating the scope of the inci-
dental powers created in the enacting legislation would have had to
been reached. Justices McTiernan and Murphy reached this sec-
ond step and considered the entire Act valid. Indeed, the only real
difference between the dissent and the majority opinion of the
above three Justices was that Justices Stephens and Gibbs held that
the States had acquired sovereignty in the territorial sea belt.
Therefore, with the exception of the continental shelf, the Com-
monwealth could not expropriate the State's land under these cir-
cumstances.8 9
Since the dissenters held that the States owned these areas, a
87. 50 A.L.J.R. 232-33 (1975).
88. Id at 256.
89. Id at 256. Justices Gibbs and Stephens held the States had never asserted sover-
eignty over the continental shelf, this concept being a past World War II phenomena. Id at
243, 259.
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classic problem on the limits of the external affairs power was
presented. Justice Gibbs resolved this in favor of the States:
A law to divest powers from a State and vest them in the Com-
monwealth could be regarded as a law with respect to external
affairs; such a law would relate to the internal organization of the
nation and not its international relations. The existence of the
Commonwealth as a state and the exercise of its functions as a
national government do not enable it to alter at will the distribu-
tion of powers made by the Constitution.9"
In an obvious reference to Justices Murphy and McTiernan's opin-
ion, Justice Stephens added:
If there is one consistent theme to be found throughout judicial
discussion of the nature and extent of the external affairs power
of the Commonwealth it is that it is undesirable to seek to ex-
press, in dicta, broad ranging views concerning its scope which
go beyond the needs of the case in hand.9'
The above excerpts from the dissenting opinion neatly express the
view that the external affairs power of the Commonwealth cannot
be used, under the cloak of a treaty or convention, to claim sover-
eignty for the Federal Government over State land without due
process. This is a view which at least three of the majority would
probably have concurred in if they had resolved the question of
title the other way.
C Emerging Trends in Australia's External Affairs Power
Where has the Submerged Lands case brought us in relation to
the Burgess case and the Second New South Wales Airlines case? I
believe two distinct trends have finally emerged. First, the trend to
expand the scope of what constitutes an external affair has emerged
from the total victory of Justices Evatt and McTiernan's view. Sec-
ond, the trend toward liberal interpretation of regulations, which is
Justice Starke's view, appears to have prevailed. Considering this
last trend we have only to look at Chief Justice Barwick's state-
ment:
But it is clear from the reasons for judgment that if the Regula-
tions had been apt to carry out the Convention, the fact that they
operated upon matters which otherwise did not fall within the
power of the Parliament would not have invalidated them. Be-
ing in themselves valid, they could operate in the States in re-
spect of matters over which the Parliament otherwise had no
90. Id at 233.
91. Id at 256.
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legislative power: further, being valid, they would supercede any
inconsistent law of a State. . . . The ambit of the power with
respect to external affairs cannot be restrained by any reserve
powers doctrine.
9 2
On the issue of interpreting regulations, Chief Justice Barwick has
considerably changed his statements from the "closely scrutinize"
terminology of the Second New South Wales Airlines case. With
Justice Murphy joining in an expansive view of incidental regula-
tions alongside Justice McTiernan, a solid block of three out of
seven Justices have taken a clear position. While it cannot be said
with total confidence where the other four Justices stand with re-
spect to incidental legislation, the expansive view of what consti-
tutes an external matter held by the other two members of the
majority, Justices Jacobs and Mason, may indicate where their
sympathies lie.
It may also be possible to assign the dissenters in the Sub-
merged Lands case a role other than one of narrow interpretation.
Since Justices Gibbs and Stephens decided the case more on the
basis of land title than on a federal versus state balance, they may
well favor a more liberal approach. It should be pointed out that
those portions of the Act implementing the Continental Shelf Con-
vention were upheld by all seven Justices.93
Finally, the trend to expand the scope of an external matter
should be considered. While there does not seem to be a belief that
subjects can be neatly divided, apriori, between external and inter-
nal affairs, three Justices decided the Submerged Lands case on the
basis of the matter being so external that a treaty was not needed to
invoke section 51(29).
At first glance, we can add to our list of external affairs those
matters which are geographically external from the Commonwealth
and States. For those, a treaty or convention is not required for
Commonwealth legislation. This would, for example, permit the
Commonwealth to legislate penal laws for citizens abroad. These
92. Id at 256.
93. Minister for Justice (W.A.) (at the Relation of Amsett Transport Industries (Opera-
tions) Pty. Ltd.) v. Australian National Airlines Commission and Another, 51 A.L.J.R. 299
(1977), a case concerning the validity of aviation regulations permitting control of some in-
tra-State aviation as an incidental regulation pursuant to Commonwealth power as to Terri-
tories under § 122 of the Constitution, showed a slightly different line-up of Justices. Justices
Stephen, Mason, and Murphy held the regulations were valid as an incidental power to legis-
lation enacted under Parliament's plenary powers in § 122. Chief Justice Barwick and Jus-
tice Gibbs dissented. Justice Murphy again took the strongest position on the powers of the
Commonwealth Parliament. Justice Gibbs was the most restrictive.
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are things it cannot do if the citizen is intra-State, unless the crime
directly affects the Commonwealth government, as in the Sharkey
case. When the subject matter moves within the boundary of the
Commonwealth, specifically intra-State, an international treaty,
agreement or entanglement of some kind will be needed to support
domestic legislation. In other words, Chief Justice Latham's test of
reciprocity or mutual interest may have to be met unless the ration-
ale of the Sharkey case applies.
Taking Justice Murphy's analysis on the scope of external mat-
ters one step further, a question may be raised as to whether the
geographical distinction used by Chief Justice Barwick and Justices
Mason and Jacobs was what Justice Murphy intended when he
stated that the Act, even without a convention, "would still be a law
with respect to external affairs."94 Suppose, for instance, that the
Commonwealth desires to legislate domestically in order to outlaw
narcotic drugs and usurp all State control via federal preemption of
the field. This subject is both external and internal, not delegated
specifically to the Commonwealth, and traditionally left to State
control. Surely the Commonwealth could ratify an international
convention with some country, point to imposing mutual obliga-
tions, and thereby invoke domestic legislation under section 51(29).
It is not clear how the High Court could legally distinguish those
situations where the Commonwealth was signing agreements solely
for the purpose of increasing its domestic legislative powers and
those situations where it was ratifying an agreement out of genuine
interest in resolving an international affair.9" With the increasing
interaction of the nations, there are few subjects on which an agree-
94. 50 A.L.J.R. 278 (1975). This may be especially true in the light of the United States
and Canadian cases on the same issue. The United States Supreme Court asserted Federal
primacy over the marginal sea on account of Federal "paramounty" in the area of foreign
relations. See U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950);
U.S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); U.S. v. California,
382 U.S. 448 (1965). The Canadian case, however, was decided on the same narrow legalistic
view of historical land title as the instant Australian case. See Reference re Ownership of
Off-shore Mineral Rights, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 (1967). This narrow view was criticized as
overlooking the factor of international responsibility and the unsatisfactory result of having
jurisdiction split in federal states. O'Connell, Problems ofAustralian Coastal Jurisdiction, 42
A.L.J. 39, 41 (1968). See also Harders, Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legislatiom A Survey
of Its Constitutional Background and Its Federal Features, 6 MELB. U.L. REV. 415, 423-24
(1968). (Author feels Commonwealth has power to legislate under § 51(29) to give effect to
rules that are part of customary international law.)
95. C. HOWARD, supra note 7, mentions this problem at 451. In the Burgess case the
Court held it would not tolerate the use of international agreements by the Commonwealth
as a facade for the acquisition of domestic legislative power. Burgess, supra note 28, at 642,
669 and 687. Also, Chief Justice Barwick has used the famous phrase "[Tlhe mere fact that
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ment could be signed and not involve some mutual reciprocity of
obligation. Perhaps for this reason, Justice Murphy was dismissing
Chief Justice Latham's test as neither getting at the heart of the
issue of what is external nor as serving any limiting purpose.
Perhaps, Justice Murphy was urging a test that would simply
say: If upon balance the subject is reasonably related to external
affairs and the legislation rationally achieves the Government's ex-
ternal affairs objective, then legislation with domestic effects may
be enacted under section 51(29) regardless of the existence of a
written international obligation or reliance upon another head of
power. The only limitation upon this power would be the High
Court's careful watch on the overall federal system. If this is what
Justice Murphy really meant, and subsequent cases tend to show
that it was, then he has moved significantly toward the United
States concept of a federal balance of power.96
As for the other members of the majority in the Submerged
Lands case, certainly Justice McTiernan and possibly Chief Justice
Barwick and Justice Mason appear to have accepted the fact of an
exercise of the external affairs power that does not meet Chief Jus-
tice Latham's test of mutual obligation, yet is nonetheless valid
since the subject matter is truly external or foreign. If so, then Jus-
tice Murphy may not be as far out in front as first appears.
Regardless of what tests, or even if no tests are used, the real
issue for the Australian High Court is going to be whether each
individual Justice, on the facts of a particular case, favors an expan-
sion of the central government's power. In the opinions of the Sub-
merged Lands case, one can detect a willingness on the part of
Chief Justice Barwick and Justice Murphy to favor the Common-
wealth. Chief Justice Barwick carried his statements in the Second
New South Wales Airlines case forward another step by denying
States any "reserve powers doctrine" that would prevent a valid
law enacted pursuant to section 51(29) from operating on an intra-
State basis. This statement was a direct reference to Justice Holmes
denial of that same power to the States of the United States under
the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution.97
A final indication of a growing High Court favoritism toward
the Commonwealth was Chief Justice Barwick and Justice Mur-
the Commonwealth has subscribed to some international document does not necessarily at-
tract any power to the Commonwealth Parliament." 113 C.L.R. 54, 85 (1975).
96. See note 73 supra.
97. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920).
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phy's belief that the demands of twentieth century relationships
mean that only the Commonwealth Government can effectively
legislate under section 51(29) to give effect to many international
agreements:
Whilst the power with respect to external affairs is not expressed
to be a power exclusively vested in the Commonwealth it must
necessarily of its nature be so as to international relations and
affairs. 98 (Chief Justice Barwick)
The practical experience of our Constitution is that this . . .
[making of laws for implementation of treaties and conventions]
. . . can only be done effectively by the national Parliament.9 9
(Justice Murphy)
The idea of domestic legislation pursuant to section 51(29) for
the purpose of implementing a non-binding agreement which cov-
ers a non-geographically external matter and involving a subject
normally reserved to the States is what the Court may be moving
toward. The most obvious context in which this situation may arise
is a United Nations Resolution.
III. THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER AND THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS
In Bradley v. Commonwealth of Australia, ° the Common-
wealth Postmaster-General issued a direction that all postal and
communications services for the Rhodesian Information Center be
suspended. The Government sought to justify its action partly on
the grounds of implementing a non-binding United Nations Secur-
ity Council Resolution. The Resolution called upon United Na-
tions members to take action at the national level, under Article 41
of the Charter of the United Nations, to interrupt postal communi-
cations with the Smith Regime in Rhodesia.
The suit against the Commonwealth challenged the Postmas-
ter-General's authority to issue such a directive. The governments
defense relied on the United Nations Resolution. When the Court
reached this issue,' Chief Justice Barwick stated that:
Since the Charter and the Resolutions of the Security Council
98. 50 A.L.J.R. 218, 226 (1975).
99. Id at 278.
100. Bradley v. Commonwealth of Australia, 128 C.L.R. 557 (1973).
101. The decision was 3-2 upholding the injunction against the Postmaster-General. The
case was principally decided on the power of the Postmaster as given in the Post and Tele-
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have not been carried into effect within Australia by appropriate
legislation, they cannot be relied upon as a justification for exec-
utive acts that would otherwise be unjustified . '02
Justice Gibbs, concurring, stated that:
Resolutions of the Security Council neither form part of the law
of the Commonwealth nor by their own force confer any power
on the Executive Government of the Commonwealth which it
would not otherwise possess.'
0 3
Chief Justice Barwick and Justice Gibbs were saying that although
Parliament had passed the United Nations Charter, it was not, in
and of itself, implementing legislation. Hence, neither the Charter
nor the Resolutions could be relied upon to justify Executive acts.
Following the Walker v. Baird"° theory of Westminster Govern-
ment, subsequent domestic legislation was necessary.
The Bradley case is significant because it sets forth a clear
statement of the position the United Nations Charter occupies in
the Australian legal system and prevents either the courts or the
Executive from using the Charter as a legal basis for affecting do-
mestic individual rights.0 5 It is important to note that the opinion
does not state that the legislature may not enact legislation pursuant
to non-binding Security Council Resolutions. But again, what if
the legislature treads on an area traditionally reserved to the states?
Will the Charter serve as a reservoir for Commonwealth central
government expansion? The answer to these questions was reached
by Justice Murphy in Dowal v. Murray,"° the most recent High
Court case touching on section 51(29).
In Dowal, the High Court needed to find a head of delegated
power to support the Parliament's decision to legislate with respect
to child custody after the death of one spouse.' 7 The Court found
102. Id at 582.
103. Id
104. See notes 27-30 supra, and accompanying text.
105. For cases on the Charter's position in the United States see Diggs v. Shultz, 470
F.2d 463 (1972); Sei Fujii v. State, 217 F.2d 481 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950), rev'd, 242 F.2d 619
(1952).
106. Dowal v. Murray and Another, 53 A.L.J.R. 134 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as
Dowall.
107. The Australian Family Law Act of 1975 provided that on the death of a party to a
marriage in whose favor a custody order had been entered in respect of a child, the surviving
spouse would be entitled to custody only upon application to the courts. At issue was
whether § 51(29) of the Constitution Act gave the Commonwealth power to legislate. The
Act gave power over, "Divorce and Matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental
rights, and custody and guardianship of infants." Since the Act in the instant case dealt with
custody after one of the spouses to the marriage was deceased, the narrow argument was the
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the power as an incident to the power to legislate with respect to
marriage, section 51(21). Justice Murphy was not satisfied with
that result alone and proceeded to reveal the far reaching powers he
would assign the Commonwealth under section 51(29):
On the question of constitutional power to legislate, Parliament's
power to make laws with respect to external affairs . . . should
not be overlooked. Custody is an aspect of welfare of the child.
The welfare of children has long been a subject of international
concern ....
As examples of international concern for the rights of the child,
Justice Murphy went on to cite relevant Articles of the Geneva
Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1976, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child."°
Justice Murphy then stated:
The Parliament may have recourse to this power with respect to
external affairs to carry out its international obligations in regard
to children. . . the use of the external affairs power may enable
Parliament to remove limitations on the Family Court's jurisdic-
tion which have been criticized in this and other recent cases. 10
As examples of the use of the external affairs power to make laws
which otherwise may not have been within the Commonwealth
Parliament's competence, Justice Murphy referred specifically to
the 1967 Narcotic Drugs Act, the 1974 Trade Practices Act and the
1975 Racial Discrimination Act."'
This approach to the problem of finding a head of power for
the Federal Parliament was novel and will no doubt be challenged.
None of the other Justices made mention of section 51(29). Justice
Murphy revealed in this case, what may be behind his failure to say
anything about geographical determinants of what constituted an
external matter in the Submerged Lands case. He appears very
willing to expand the power of the Federal Parliament in order to
meet, what he feels, are the demands of the twentieth century. He
custody did not arise in relation to divorce or marriage (the marriage having ended upon the
death of one of the parties.) This is a good example of the very strict interpretation of stat-
utes often applied by Australian courts.
108. 53 A.L.J.R. 134, 140-41 (1978).
109. Id
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has yet to mention any limitaions, federal or otherwise, on the lim-
its to federal jurisdictional expansion via section 51(29).
Justice Murphy was correct in pointing out the areas in which
Parliament's competence has increased. Of course, he has not been
the only Justice desiring to increase it. The Trade Practices Act of
1974, was enacted partly to carry into domestic effect the Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1975. The Act
provides penalites for trade or commercial conduct "liable to mis-
lead the public .... " 112
In A v. Judges of the Australian Industrial Court; Ex parte
C.LM Holdings,I3 the High Court indirectly was called upon to
decide whether these penalties could be applied against wholly in-
tra-State trade practices of the kind covered in the Act. In an opin-
ion by Justice Mason, with Chief Justice Barwick and Justices
Stephen, Jacobs and Murphy concurring, the Court held that the
external power alone or in combination with section 51(39) - the
incidental powers clause - could sustain that section of the Act
providing for penalties on intra-State conduct."I4 The Act could be
held to be giving effect to an international convention.
The Narcotic Drugs Act of 1967 mentioned by Justice Murphy
in the Dowal case is the principle Commonwealth legislation in that
area other than the Customs Act of 1967. It enacts into Australian
law the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961, and therefore relies on the external affairs power as
well as the trade and commerce power of section 51 (1). Obviously,
there has been some trespass into areas formerly reserved to the
States. This is so because drug possession, production, use and
dealing intra-State would be outside any inter-State commerce
power.
In a recent article on Australian drug laws, an Australian bar-
rister expressed the opinion that the Commonwealth Parliament
could use section 51(29) to oust all State drug laws inconsistent with
Federal legislation.' 5 He urged this as a means toward solving
Australia's increasing drug problems. Specific reference was made
112. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 55.
113. R. v. Judges of the Australian Industrial Court and Another; exparre C.L.M. Hold-
ings Pty. Ltd. and Another, 136 C.L.R. 235 (1977).
114. Id. at 242-43. Justice Gibbs withheld his concurrence on this part of Justice Ma-
son's opinion.
115. Brown, Federal Drug-Control Laws.- Present and Future, 8 FED. L. REv. 435, 451
(1977). Australia is also a signatory to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
The author mentions that the Whitlam government proposed a comprehensive drug act that
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to the opinions of Chief Justice Barwick and Justice Murphy in the
Submerged Lands case as providing a strong basis for permitting
this legislation.16 As long as the argument is presented to the
Court in terms of the "inter-national trade in drugs" rather than
just "drugs", the author believed international agreements could be
used to permit Commonwealth control since the subject matter has
an indisputable international character, more so than human rights
conventions." 7 If any limitations were raised, they would leave
only control of possession crimes and use crimes to State authori-
ties. 1 1
8
The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 enacted domestically
the purposes and principles of the United Nations International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion. The preamble to the Racial Discrimination Act specifically
refers to Parliament's power to make laws with respect to external
affairs as being one of the heads of power on which the Act was to
be based. Even a cursory glance at the coverage of the Act reveals
a vast arena of intra-State affairs into which the Federal Govern-
ment has injected itself. These include testementary instruments,
deeds and other contracts, employment practices, public accommo-
dations and public organizations. While the external affairs power
is not the only power relied upon, its appearance in the preamble
justifies Justice Murphy's reference to the Act in Dowal.
Finally, there are three other areas not mentioned by Justice
Murphy where there has been some movement toward an increased
federal presence in areas formerly reserved to the States. In 1973,
an argument was cogently put forth urging ratification of a conven-
tion dealing with international commercial arbitration and recipro-
cal enforcement of awards based upon Commonwealth criteria." 19
Previous practice had been to allow each State to set its own policy
on recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. The argument
in favor of ratification was that the external affairs power would
support legislation pursuant to such a convention. The reasoning
was that if trade and its regulation were considered as external af-
fairs, then "arbitration as a means of settlement of disuptes arising
would have ousted inconsistent State laws. The act which never became law was justified
under the external affairs power alone as enacting the above Convention.
116. Id at 454.
117. Id at 452-53.
118. id at 453.
119. Goldring, The 1958 United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign ArbitralA wards and the Australian Constitution, 5 FED. L. REv. 303 (1973).
Vol. 12
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in the course of such trade is also either necessarily an external af-
fair or an incident thereof ... ,, 20 The Arbitration (Foreign
Awards And Agreements) Act of 1974 was passed in late 1974 and
Australia acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The imple-
menting act sets forth the common procedures and criteria to be
used by both Federal and State courts when enforcing foreign
awards.
Another writer believes the Commonwealth Parliament has
legislative competence to take over the field of environmental con-
trol of aircraft.'2 1 Either the trade and commerce power or the ex-
ternal affairs power could support such legislation. But, rather than
legislating directly on intra-State activities, the author feels the
Commonwealth could accomplish the same result through adminis-
trative organs. 122
Finally, another barrister has argued for the use of section
51(29) as a head of power to support Commonwealth expansion of
national health insurance. 23 The Convention concerning Medical
Care and Sickness Benefits, adopted by the International Labor Or-
ganization in 1969, has not been ratified by Australia. But, the au-
thor feels that since the Convention requires all signatories to
provide specific types of health services, it could be used by the
Australian Government, if it became a signatory, to expand its leg-
islation in the health area. 124 Although the claim has been made
that the Commonwealth has no power to nationalize the medical
profession or even require the use of a federal standard prescription
form, the author feels it is at least arguable, that under the Conven-
tion, legislation might be justified in both areas.
Since 1972 we have seen section 51(29) used to justify Federal
Government movement into areas formerly reserved or thought to
be reserved to the States. These fields include territorial seas and
submerged lands, narcotic drug control, trade practices, racial dis-
crimination, arbitration awards and possibly future national health
120. Id at 308.
121. Golden, Aircraft Noise Emissions in Australar The Present Framework of Legal Con-
trol and Responsibility, 49 A.L.J. 123, 126 (1975).
122. Id The whole area of environmental law is a ripe one for Federal v. State conflict.
The cases so far seem to justify the federal legislation on the trade and commerce power
rather than legislation pursuant to an international convention. See Murphy Ores Incorpo-
rated Pty. Limited v. Commonwealth and Ors, 50 A.L.J.R. 570 (1976).
123. Kennan, The Possible Constitutional Powers of the Commonwealth as to National
Health Insurance, 49 A.L.J. 261, 266-67 (1975).
124. Id at 266.
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care. At least one Jusice would also use section 51(29) to justify
federal family law and human rights legislation. How far can Par-
liament go under this head of power?
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER
Professor Lane has listed four possible limitations on the ex-
pansion of the external affairs power, some of which have already
been discussed. 25 They include express constitutional prohibi-
tions, malafides government agreements, federalism and judicial
review.
The previously discussed cases have shown how legislation en-
acted pursuant to section 51(29) can circumvent the limitation on
other delegated powers in section 51, because each delegated power
is a separate head of power, even though interdependent on the
others. Nevertheless, express constitutional prohibitions cannot be
circumvented. It was also noted that the lack of a Bill of Rights in
the Australian Constitution probably means that these express
prohibitions are fewer in number and play a less crucial role as a
check on the treaty power than in the United States 26 . While ex-
press prohibitions are a limitation on section 51(29), it is unlikely a
case involving such a clear violation would ever come before the
High Court.
Also mentioned above was the warning of the High Court that
it would not tolerate bad faith treaties made by a Government sim-
ply for the purpose of expansion of domestic power. Again, we saw
that this may not prove to be a very important limitation. The
shrinking size of the political world has raised all kinds of domestic
matters to the level of nation to nation negotiations. As the scope
of international agreements extends, the "temptation to Govern-
ments to seek 'malafdes' agreements as a prop for constitutional
power becomes less pressing."1 27 The problems of proof of evi-
dence in such a case are also apparent.
Perhaps the only real check is the federal system itself. The
Australian Constitution provides more express legal substance for
the existence of the States than the United States Constitution.1
2 8
This legal basis for the existence of the States was recognized by the
125. Lane, ExternalAffairs Power, 40 A.L.J. 259, 262-63 (1966).
126. Thompson, supra note 33, at 133.
127. Sawer, Auzslralian Costlifutional Law, supra note 29, at 45.
128. Thompson, supra note 33, at 161.
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High Court in Melbourne Corporation v. The Commonwealth, 29 the
classic case on Australian federalism.
[T]he foundation of the Constitution is the conception of the cen-
tral government and a number of State governments separately
organized. The Constitution predicates their continued existence
as independent entities.1
30
But, even if the Court has recognized that the Commonwealth may
not destroy the existence of the States, what are the tests used by the
Court to decide when the existence of the States as separate entities
is being threatened?
The following passage from the Melbourne Corporation case
probably expresses the most encompassing test for judicial determi-
nation that a law tending to destroy the States is unconstitutional.
No doubt the nature and extent of the activity affected must be
considered and also whether the interference is or is not discrimi-
natory but in the end the question must be whether the legisla-
tion or the executive action curtails or interferes in a substantial
manner with the exercise of constitutional power by the other. 131
In other words, the Court will look to the practical application of
the law.
If the Court should decide to use this test against any treaty
implementing legislation, two additional problems complicating the
decision will have to be faced. First, as previously discussed, sub-
ject matter alone is of no real help unless the subject matter is geo-
graphically external, as in the Submerged Lands case. Second, the
external affairs power is frequently only one pillar supporting the
legislation. The trade and commerce power, as in the airlines cases
or the defense power, as in Roche v. Kronheimer,132 frequently are
used to support domestic legislation.
The issue of where to draw the line between a treaty power
capable of centralizing all government power or a federal system
unresponsive to twentieth century international obligations has not
been faced squarely by the High Court. Like its United States
counterpart, the High Court has established a trend toward permit-
ting increased reliance upon section 51(29) to expand Common-
129. Melbourne Corporation v. The Commonwealth, 74 C.L.R. 31 (1947) [hereinafter
referred to as Melbourne Corporalion].
130. Id at 65 (Justice Rich).
131. Id. at 75 (Justice Starke). For the United States case on treaty limitations see Ge-
ofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). See also L. Heinkin, supra note 31, at 137-56.
132. See note 37 supra.
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wealth powers. 133 Every legislative act under a treaty which
expands central government power alters the federal balance in
some way, even if ever so subtle. Following this inch by inch ap-
proach, the issue of federalism may never be reached. After all, the
State governments do not have to be destroyed or one of the ex-
press constitutional prohibitions violated for the Commonwealth to
radically alter the balance of power. The regulatory activity of the
United States Government under the Commerce Clause is an ex-
ample of this.
134
If the trend in Australia continues, then any real limitations
based upon federalism will depend on the Justices' own perception
of the role which judicial review should play in the Australian con-
stitutional structure. In close cases, the Justices, like their United
States counterparts, will resort to their personal beliefs on the na-
ture of the federal system. They will have to decide whether the
High Court should attempt to draw a firm line in favor of a fixed
federal system or whether the fate of federalism should be decided
by the electoral process.
V. CONCLUSION
The opinions of the High Court, developments in Australian
politics, and the increasing interdependence of the nations of the
world are all favorable to continued use of the external affairs
power by the Commonwealth to encroach into areas previously left
to the States. Both of Australia's political parties have found it nec-
essary to use the external affairs power to their advantage. 35 To a
United States lawyer, it is interesting to observe the way in which
the High Court has permitted the Commonwealth to accomplish
centralization and uniformity in areas which, in the United States,
would have been easily justified by resort to the Commerce Clause.
The restrictions in the Australian Constitution on Commonwealth
exercise of the commerce power, as well as the general reluctance of
Commonwealth courts to interpret broadly the definition of com-
merce, may have been a cause motivating the Commonwealth to
resort to the external affairs power to accomplish the same desired
objectives.
If the path which the United States Supreme Court has walked
133. For the trend in the United States see Thompson, supra note 33, at 179-83.
134. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). But see National Legue of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
135. Sawer, Execution of Treaties, supra note 29, at 303.
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with respect to the Commerce Clause gives guidance, it points in
the direction of increasing centralization for Australia and the use
of section 51(29) to justify the centralization. Somewhere in the
future may lurk a decision by the High Court in the nature of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usury.'36 Nevertheless, as long as the
Commonwealth avoids infringement of an express constitutional
prohibition the potential for centralization by use of the external
affairs power is vast. If progress in the direction of increased use of
this power has seemed slow, one must remember that the Austra-
lian treaty power is, in a sense, a Court created power, since the
Constitution makers did not even mention the word treaty in the
Constitution Act.
Using the history of the United States Supreme Court's devel-
opment of the Commerce Clause for comparison, it is doubtful that
any judicial tests of subject matter or reciprocity of mutual obliga-
tion will survive. If for no other reason, they do not fit well into
what is basically an area that is highly changeable and filled with
political questions. Any future decisions by the High Court will
most likely closely reflect the trends of the political arena rather
than attempt to construct sophisticated "tests" of the limits of that
power.
136. See note 134 supra.
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